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RABBI LAMM, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, AND
COMPARATIVE JEWISH LAW
“The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakha”

R

abbi Norman Lamm’s 1956 article, “The Fifth Amendment and
Its Equivalent in the Halakha,”1 provides important lessons for
scholarship in both Jewish and American law. Sixty-five years after
it was published, the article remains, in many ways, a model for interdisciplinary and comparative study of Jewish law, drawing upon sources in the
Jewish legal tradition, American legal history, and modern psychology. In so
doing, the article proves faithful to each discipline on its own terms, producing insights that illuminate all three disciplines while respecting the internal
logic within each one. In addition to many other distinctions, since its initial
publication, R. Lamm’s article has received the attention of scholars, has
been republished, and has been cited in several judicial opinions—among
them, two United States Supreme Court opinions, including the landmark
Miranda v. Arizona.2 As such, the article stands as a prime illustration of the
potential promise of exploring Jewish law through the prism of modern
thought and applying Jewish legal principles to contemporary issues.
At the same time, however, the legacy of R. Lamm’s article is neither
simple nor monolithic. Notwithstanding its well-deserved reception and
undeniable merit, a close look at the article in broader context may also
reveal some of the potential perils latent in attempts to draw too close a
connection between classical Jewish legal sources and contemporary
modes of thought. For example, although the citation to the article in the
Miranda decision is not only notable but, to some degree, quite remarkable, the Supreme Court’s reliance on R. Lamm’s discussion of Jewish
law may be misplaced, if not arguably inaccurate. Likewise, R. Lamm’s
innovative references to Freudian psychology to explain the ban on selfincrimination in Jewish law may raise questions of its own regarding the
prudence and effectiveness of adopting a particular scientific or philosophical

146

TRADITION 53:3 / © 2021
Rabbinical Council of America

Samuel J. Levine
position to understand a Jewish legal principle. Thus, alongside its exemplary methodology and abiding value, the article may also provide cautionary lessons for the future study of comparative Jewish law.
Rambam and the Supreme Court: Promise and Peril
Throughout the article, R. Lamm’s analysis displays distinctive characteristics that contribute to producing an effective approach to the study of comparative Jewish law. In fact, the article employs a methodology that may
serve more generally as a model for comparative legal scholarship, avoiding
some of the pitfalls that, not infrequently, accompany such efforts. Perhaps
most importantly, it carefully and accurately presents, explores, and explains
the rule against self-incrimination in Jewish law, on its own terms, before
attempting to draw comparisons and lessons to be applied to the American
legal system.
For example, the article makes clear that unlike American law, which
empowers criminal suspects with a privilege against self-incrimination,
Jewish law categorically prohibits the use of a criminal defendant’s confession as evidence against the defendant. Likewise, in considering a rationale for the outright ban on self-incrimination in Jewish law, R. Lamm
turns to no less an authority than Rambam, who, alongside his legal discussion in Mishneh Torah, offers a salient suggestion for the underlying
reasons behind the rule, premised upon profound insights into the human
mind. R. Lamm’s analysis thereby steers clear of the tendency, sometimes
found in comparative law scholarship, to reinterpret—or rewrite—the
substance of one legal system to facilitate a facile comparison to another
system.
If anything, remaining true to Jewish law on its terms allows for a
more fruitful application of Jewish legal principles to the American legal
system. As R. Lamm’s article notes, Rambam emphasizes that the rule
against self-incrimination is based on a divine decree. Yet, his comparisons
to American law focus on Rambam’s psychological exposition of the conceptual underpinnings behind Jewish law’s ban on self-incrimination,
relying primarily on Rambam’s explanation that: “Perhaps this person’s
mind is sick in this matter; perhaps he is one of those who are perturbed
and bitter of soul, who wish for death, who pierce their bellies with swords
and throw themselves off roofs. Perhaps this man thus comes and confesses to a crime which he did not commit” (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6).
Accordingly, R. Lamm’s approach eschews attempts to superficially—
and artificially—transplant principles of Jewish law onto American law.
Rather than imposing particularistic theological concepts, such as divine
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origins of the law, that are inconsistent with, if not inimical to, the values
and assumptions of the American legal system, he relies on Rambam’s
more universal understanding of the human condition,3 which provides
lessons that can be applied in a manner that is consistent with the internal
logic of American law as well.
The effectiveness of R. Lamm’s approach is borne out in numerous
citations to the article by American courts and scholars, demonstrating
that R. Lamm successfully developed a methodology that did not seek to
transplant—but instead, accurately and thoughtfully translated—concepts
drawn from the Jewish legal system in a way that was applicable to the
workings of the American legal system. Most famously, the article was
cited, alongside a reference to Rambam’s view, in the landmark United
States Supreme Court decision, Miranda v. Arizona, at the outset of an
important section of the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl
Warren. The citation to the article in Miranda is rather notable, appearing as it does in an opinion written by one of the court’s most prominent
chief justices, in one of the most well-known cases in the history of the
United States.
In retrospect, the legal doctrine the Miranda case established—requiring
that police issue “Miranda warnings” when conducting a custodial interrogation—may seem somewhat underwhelming, if only because of its
familiarity. At the time the case was decided, however, the rule was fairly
revolutionary in upending common police procedure, and to this day, the
opinion has engendered not a small amount of controversy and criticism.
Thus, Chief Justice Warren’s citation to R. Lamm’s article emerges as all
the more remarkable, placed in a footnote documenting the declaration
that: “We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the
fervor with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times.”4
The substance of the footnote references Rambam’s view that the Jewish
law against self-incrimination is based in the Torah, followed by a reference to R. Lamm’s article. It would seem that, conscious of just how
groundbreaking the new rule would prove to be, Chief Justice Warren
looked back to Jewish legal history to find a particularly powerful antecedent to Fifth Amendment rights, tracing to Rambam and, in turn, to
biblical sources.
The significance of R. Lamm’s article becomes even more apparent in
light of its timeliness, both in 1956, when it was first published, and a
decade later when it was cited in Miranda. At the start of the article, he
introduces the substantive discussion of self-incrimination with a number of
paragraphs depicting the history and importance of the Fifth Amendment,
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described as “embattled... questioned, attacked and defended in the past,”
and most immediately implicated by “the Communist issue.” As a direct
response to McCarthyism and the associated encroachments on the
American right against self-incrimination, R. Lamm called on Jewish tradition to lodge a bold protest against the recent past and to offer a similarly bold challenge for the future. A decade later, Chief Justice Warren
took up R. Lamm’s challenge, relying on Jewish law in seizing the opportunity to expand the contours of Fifth Amendment protections.
In this reading, situated within broader societal and legal context, the
article stands as a prime example of the promise and potential for comparative Jewish legal scholarship. It draws upon traditional and authoritative texts in Jewish law and philosophy to address an urgent matter of vital
importance in American law and society. Through a comparative and
contrasting analysis of the rule against self-incrimination it provided both
a rear-view perspective on a dark episode in recent American history and
a more positive roadmap for the future of the American legal and societal
landscape.
Yet, without discounting the impressive quality and widespread influence of “The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakha,” upon
close examination, the references to Jewish law in Miranda may illustrate
some of the limitations—if not the perils—of comparative Jewish legal
scholarship. Specifically, in support of the proposition that the “roots” of
the American privilege against self-incrimination “go back into ancient
times,” the footnote in Miranda declares that Rambam “found an analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible,” then quotes, verbatim and
without further comment, a translated segment of the discussion in Mishneh Torah: “To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be
declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.”5 The footnote
concludes with the citation to R. Lamm’s article.
These references, and the opinion’s accompanying reliance on Jewish
legal sources, raise a number of methodological questions. For example,
the assertion that the “roots” of the privilege against self-incrimination
“go back into ancient times”—apparently implying that the Fifth Amendment is somehow an outgrowth of the ban on self-incrimination in Jewish
law—is premised upon a historically dubious and conceptually unnecessary and inapposite claim.
On a historical level, somewhat surprisingly—though perhaps not
crucially—the opinion implicitly accepts at face value Rambam’s statements
that under Jewish legal theory, the rule is a divine decree and, therefore,
is of ancient and biblical vintage. In any event, the opinion arguably and
tenuously identifies the rule in Jewish law as the basis for the American
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privilege against self-incrimination, a position that is not documented
in the opinion and runs contrary to most historical studies. Although
finding ancient origins for the Miranda warnings, or at least for the Fifth
Amendment, might have been helpful for buttressing the legitimacy of
the majority’s holding, the opinion does not provide historical evidence
for this claim.
Perhaps even more problematic, on a conceptual level, the opinion
in Miranda appears to advocate that the American legal system should
adopt a rule regarding self-incrimination in accordance with Jewish legal
doctrine. If so, the analysis falls short, on at least two separate but related
grounds: First, substantively, the rule that was established in Miranda bears
relatively little resemblance to the Jewish law against self-incrimination.
As R. Lamm developed at length in his article, the Talmudic rule precludes the evidentiary use of confessions against the criminal defendant,
regardless of its voluntariness—indeed, even contrary to the express wishes of the confessant. In sharp contrast, Miranda continues to permit the
admissibility of voluntary criminal confessions, even when obtained through
various forms of aggressive and adversarial police interrogation, pursuant
to the issuance of Miranda warnings. In fact, American prosecutors depend heavily on the use of confessions as one of the most valuable pieces
of inculpatory evidence against criminal defendants. It would seem anomalous to rely upon a rule that categorically bans confessions to derive a
policy that merely mandates that a confession be deemed voluntary before being offered into evidence.
Second, Chief Justice Warren’s methodology raises even more questions, attempting to apply and seemingly import into the American legal
system a principle that the footnote describes as a “divine decree.” It might
have been expected that, like R. Lamm, Chief Justice Warren would emphasize Rambam’s psychological explanation for the ban on self-incriminatory
confessions in Jewish law, which grows out of an account of the human
condition relevant to the contemporary American legal system as well.
Instead, unlike R. Lamm’s methodology, which focused on the conceptual
underpinnings of the Jewish law and its applicability within the internal
logic of American jurisprudence, Chief Justice Warren appears to mechanically transplant a religious rule by referencing its divine authority—neither
exploring its underlying rationale or justification, nor explaining its substantive or conceptual connection to American legal thought.
To be sure, it should be appreciated that a jurist as distinguished as
Chief Justice Warren expressed and demonstrated such interest and admiration for the Jewish legal system.6 At the same time, it should be recognized
that, in forgoing the kind of careful approach employed in R. Lamm’s
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article, the comparative law analysis in Miranda presents an incomplete
picture of Jewish law on its own terms, while applying Jewish law in a
superficial way that remains inconsistent with basic tenets of the American
system. As such, the opinion in Miranda may illustrate some of the limitations, and even the potential peril, of the comparative Jewish law project.7
Rambam and Freud: Promise and Peril
Among many other salient features of “The Fifth Amendment and Its
Equivalent in the Halakha,” a discussion of Sigmund Freud and Karl
Menninger stands out as particularly notable, again providing a strong
case for the potential promise of comparative Jewish legal analysis.
After presenting a careful summary of Jewish law on its own terms,
including both the doctrinal and psychological bases for the ban on
criminal confessions in the Jewish legal system, the article proceeds
with an analysis of Rambam’s rationale for the rule through a comparison to modern psychology. In looking to contemporary insights to
enrich our understanding and appreciation of an area of traditional
Jewish law and philosophy, the article follows the path forged by
countless generations of scholars who have revisited and explored important aspects of Jewish law and tradition through the prism of ongoing scientific and philosophical advances.
The article’s doctrinal analysis of Jewish law is built upon foundational sources, including, most fundamentally, the Talmudic exposition of
the directive that an individual is one’s own closest relative and, therefore,
is precluded from offering self-incriminatory testimony (Sanhedrin 9b,
Ketubot 18b). As the article adds, however, “[b]ehind this Talmudic derivation... lie deeper motives as expounded by [Rambam] and generally
accepted by later Talmudists.” After quoting Rambam’s view, the article
observes that “[d]espite his obvious hesitancy and his ultimate reliance
on Biblical authority, which requires no further explanation, [Rambam’s]
rationale of the Halakhic point of view on self-incrimination is grounded
on psychological considerations.”
Having thereby established the validity and cogency of offering a psychological explanation for the Talmudic rule against self-incrimination,
the article extends and updates the analysis to incorporate contemporary
psychology as well. Concluding that Rambam “must have intuitively
sensed the fact that the propensity toward suicide is much more widespread than one might believe at first sight,” the article asserts that Rambam “anticipated by some seven hundred years, albeit in rudimentary
fashion, a major achievement of psychoanalysis.”
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Against this backdrop, the article compares Rambam’s position to
Freud’s “theory of the Death Wish or Death Instinct,” which, “when it
reaches its ultimate expression and is redirected towards the self, appears as
suicide.” Moreover, the article suggests, consistent with Karl Menninger’s
refinement of Freud’s ideas, Rambam “intuitively grasped a more elaborate
understanding of the Death Wish as manifesting itself also as a focalized or
partial self-destruction.” Thus, the article maintains, “modern psychoanalytic theory supports [Rambam’s] explanation of the Halakhic view on selfincrimination, an explanation which relies on the universality of the instinct
of self-destruction.”
Finally, the article takes this analysis one step further, claiming that
Jewish law “goes even deeper than either Menninger or [Rambam] dared
in this respect.” Indeed, the article notes that the Talmudic ban on selfincrimination extends beyond scenarios in which the confessant would
face criminal punishment, to include situations when the consequence
would be the disqualification of the confessant as a witness in the future.
Accordingly, the article contends, Jewish law recognizes that “the Death
Wish expresses itself in more subtle ways than heretofore realized—namely,
in the disparagement of the self, in sordid public confession, especially of
the kind that has recently found expression in the writings and records of
the more morbid self-confessed ex-Communists.” In short, “[i]t is this
broader view of the Death Wish and its universality that we must recognize in the Halakha, if its legal principle on self-incrimination is to have a
psychological foundation.”
In many ways, R. Lamm’s discussion of Rambam and Freud reinforces the article’s display of the potential promise of comparative Jewish
law, again incorporating some of the most important features necessary
for effective comparative study. First, the article carefully and accurately
depicts Jewish law on its own terms, primarily through the Talmud and
Mishneh Torah. Second, the article relates traditional Jewish law and philosophy to vital matters of contemporary American law and social policy,
in a manner that is consistent with the internal logic of modern scientific
and societal assessments. As a result, the article presents a fresh way of
looking at multiple disciplines, including, among others, Jewish law and
philosophy, psychology, and American law, politics, and sociology.
Still, R. Lamm’s reliance on Freud and Menninger to understand the
Talmud and Rambam may raise further questions, pointing to additional
elements of potential peril—or at least indicating an additional need for
caution—in the study of comparative Jewish law. As impressive as R.
Lamm’s analysis remains, his proposed rationale for a divinely mandated
and enduring rule in the Jewish legal system turns, in large part, on
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substantial adoption of the findings of early twentieth-century psychoanalytic theory. Freud’s theories, however, in this area and others, have
long been the subject of intense controversy, and are far from being universally accepted. Notwithstanding the scholarly appeal and the intellectual achievement of reconciling Jewish law and philosophy with scientific
advances, and despite the abiding importance of attempts to mine the
wisdom behind the rules of the Torah, the effort to find too close a correlation between divine law and humans’ inherently limited grasp of the
world and human nature may bring about concomitant risks that should
not be underestimated or ignored.
The legacy of R. Norman Lamm’s scholarship on Jewish and American
law, and the lessons it carries for their comparative study, go far beyond
the import and impact of this one article. Subsequent to its publication in
1956, R. Lamm employed a similar methodology to address numerous
matters of vital significance to the American legal system, including,
among others, privacy and the Fourth Amendment and the separation of
governmental powers. Each of these works merits attention of its own,
likewise contributing to the recognition of the ongoing relevance of R.
Lamm’s work and the potential promise (and peril) of comparative Jewish
law for examining current, unfolding, and enduring events and controversies in American law, society, and politics.8
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